It opposes claims that the conflict in Iran is accelerating the demise of the petrodollar.
Instead, RealInvestmentAdvice.com points out that it claims the opposite: Between Iran and Venezuela, the U.S. is defending and strengthening the dollar’s dominance in the oil trade.
The 75-year-old petrodollar system is based on the fact that oil is priced and traded in dollars, keeping the dollar prominent in all world trade.
China is undermining the petrodollar through yuan settlement systems and by deepening its ties with some Arab countries.
Instead of Iran being a“perfect storm” that weakens the petrodollar, as some claim, Choyleva sees U.S. military involvement in Iran as support for the dollar.
Simple: control the flow of oil, and you determine the currency in which it is traded.
Most Arab countries support the U.S. campaign against Iran. Importantly,“the security deployment was tested; it held up.”
This reinforced the security-for-oil-price agreement underlying the petrodollar system.
Removing Venezuelan President Maduro and influencing Venezuelan oil achieve similar goals.
If the U.S. controls the oil reserves of the Western Hemisphere, it would control more oil than OPEC combined, providing enormous leverage to keep oil in dollars.
The author sees two scenarios for how the war ends.
First, an agreement that gives the US influence over Iranian oil flows.
Second, American troops take the island of Kharg and guard the Strait of Hormuz.
In her words, controlling“the bottleneck through which a fifth of the world’s oil flows.”
Either way, both events lead to more dollar-based oil trading, not less.
She concludes that “those who think the petrodollar is already in its death throes, read the chart upside down. The storm is real. The dollar is fighting back.”
Crude oil
Global oil demand growth completely wiped out by energy shock in Gulf
The global demand destruction playbook we outlined last month, which described how the Gulf energy shock would spread across continents, is now being widely realized. The International Energy Agency said in an update that global oil demand will decline this year for the first time since 2020.
“The war in Iran has thoroughly shaken the global outlook for oil consumption,” writes the IEA in its Oil Market Report. “Demand destruction will spread as scarcity and higher prices persist.”
The IEA said the conflict between the U.S. and Iran and the disruption of the bottleneck in Hormuz have changed the global oil market from a year of growth to a year of demand destruction, with global oil demand now expected to fall by 80,000 barrels per day instead of growing by 730,000 barrels per day as previously forecast.
Tanker flows through the world’s most critical waterway collapsed to about 3.8 million barrels per day in early April, down from more than 20 million barrels per day before the conflict, while alternative export routes, mainly pipelines from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iraq, only partially offset the disruption. The end result was a total export loss of as much as 13 million barrels per day.
Physical oil markets worldwide tightened considerably, with spot oil and refined product prices trading above futures prices. North Sea Dated crude oil traded for nearly $130 a barrel, and physical cargoes briefly approached $150.
IEA noted that the wave of demand destruction hit the Middle East and Asia-Pacific hardest, especially in naphtha, LPG and kerosene, as petrochemical plants cut operating rates, flights were canceled and households and businesses faced fuel shortages and price shocks.
Strategic reserves are being depleted to soften the shock. Global oil inventories fell 85 million barrels in March, with large declines outside the Gulf, while crude oil and product storage in the Gulf rose sharply due to the Hormuz disturbance.
Two weeks ago, JPMorgan’s chief commodities expert described how the demand destruction crisis would spread from the Gulf region; first Asia, then Africa and Europe, before eventually hitting the U.S., especially California.
Last week, IEA boss Fatih Birol warned against panicked hoarding of crude oil and crude products in an interview with Financial Times.
“I urge all countries not to impose export bans or restrictions,” Fatih Birol stressed in the interview. “It is the worst time if you look at global oil markets. Their trading partners, their allies and their neighbors will suffer as a result.”
The FT noted that Birol was “careful not to name China directly,” but made it very clear that his warning was likely aimed at Beijing, which has already moved to limit exports of critical refined products, including gasoline, diesel and jet fuel.
Jeff Currie of Carlyle recently outlined the risks of hoarding in a note titled“A Crude Awakening“: “The physical shortage is the trigger; the behavioral response is the multiplier.”
Source: Jeff Currie: The Global Economy is in for a (C)rude Awakening by VBL
The IEA’s baseline scenario in today’s new report assumes that Gulf tanker flows will begin to recover by mid-year, but will not return to pre-war levels. It also warned that if the conflict continues, energy markets and countries highly exposed to Gulf flows should prepare for even more severe disruptions in the coming months.
Europe’s electrification strategy is ambitious but limited by lagging grid infrastructure, creating bottlenecks that slow down industry and investment.
Huge financing needs-that amount to trillions-combined with regulatory complexity and slow construction, reveal a gap between policy ambition and physical reality.
Without better coordination, prioritization and funding, Europe risks higher costs, weaker competitiveness and a stalled energy transition.
Ursula von der Leyen’s message to electrify the European economy is strategically coherent, politically appealing and, at first glance, even inevitable. It will really pay to decarbonize industry and power transportation, reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels and strengthen Europe’s competitiveness. The latter is especially valid in an increasingly fragmented geopolitical order. Electrification is presented as the backbone of Europe’s future prosperity and security.
Beneath this clear vision, however, lies an uncomfortable reality. Brussels is not only pursuing an energy transition, but is also transforming its industrial base, transportation systems, infrastructure networks and geopolitical position. All this must be done under increasing financial, physical and strategic pressure. Electrification is currently failing not because the overall idea or strategy is wrong, but because the system needed to support it is already overloaded. At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, the bill to fix that system is only just beginning to appear.
Brussels’ real core problem is not ambition, but the order of everything.
Europe is already accelerating the electrification of demand, especially in the industrial, transportation and heating sectors, while at the same time striving at an unprecedented speed to expand the supply of renewable energy. However, one crucial point seems to be constantly forgotten: the infrastructure to connect the two is dangerously behind. Policymakers and consultants need to realize that electricity systems are not abstract constructs, but physical networks with hard boundaries. Across Europe, these limits have already been reached.
The best example of this is the Netherlands.
Across the continent, the Dutch energy transition is presented as a model: one of the highest offshore wind energy deployments per capita in the world, widespread use of solar power, aggressive electrification policies and a political consensus around decarbonization. If Brussels’ overall strategy worked as intended, the Netherlands should be the model.
In reality, however, it is a warning.
Right now, the Dutch power grid can no longer keep up with the pace of change. Grid congestion in the country has become structural, not coincidentally. An ever-growing list of thousands of companies, some even listing 15,000+, are already on waiting lists for grid connections or capacity upgrades. In several Dutch regions, industrial clusters cannot expand, while new investments are delayed or diverted. The most shocking problem is that even residential areas are hampered or blocked by the lack of electricity.
The paradox is striking. At certain times, especially when wind and solar converge positively, the Netherlands produces more renewable electricity than it can use. At other times, the country cannot supply enough electricity to meet demand. The Dutch system is increasingly affected by a system that must deal with a simultaneous suffering of surplus and scarcity.
This is not a temporary imbalance, but the predictable result of a system in which generation has outpaced infrastructure. It is also where the European electrification story begins to unravel.
The European Commission’s strategy again assumes a relatively smooth scaling up of demand, supply and infrastructure. The reality, however, is much more complicated. Currently, infrastructure development lags behind due to permitting restrictions, investment bottlenecks and physical construction timelines. At the same time, demand scales nonlinearly, especially when sectors hesitate amid uncertainty about costs and net access. The system itself introduces frictions, such as congestion, constraint and volatility, all of which undermine efficiency.
Across Europe, more and more grid operators are issuing urgent warnings as connection queues grow and investment pipelines stagnate. All are looking at a situation where congestion costs are rising. Yet the policy response remains primarily focused on accelerating the rollout of renewables and electrification targets, as if infrastructure will inevitably follow.
It won’t.
Currently, electricity grids cannot be expanded at the rate of policy ambition. The building high-voltage transmission lines takes years, often more than a decade. At the same time, distribution networks require massive upgrades to accommodate decentralized generation and electrified demand. Local opposition, environmental regulations and supply chain restrictions slow all this down.
Brussels drastically underestimates the scale of investment needed, which should motivate industry leaders to develop innovative financing strategies and call for substantial capital allocation to meet the annual goal of €660 billion and more.
To be clear, this is not additional spending, but a structural redistribution of capital on a scale rarely seen outside war economies.
Given the investment needs of €1.2 trillion for electricity grids alone by 2040, policymakers should explore innovative financing models, public-private partnerships and financing instruments at the EU level to efficiently mobilize the required capital.
Addressing electrification requires a concerted effort to rebuild Europe’s entire energy backbone, highlighting the importance of coordinated strategic planning between policymakers, industry and investors to avoid economic inefficiency and political vulnerability.
That is where the Dutch case becomes valid. The Netherlands has already shown that high levels of renewable energy do not automatically lead to effective electrification. Without grid capacity, renewable energy cannot be fully utilized. Without connection security, industrial electrification stalls. Without system flexibility, volatility increases.
In other words, the transition will be economically inefficient and politically fragile.
Another important constraint is that the financial challenge does not exist in isolation. It is unfolding within a rapidly deteriorating geopolitical environment.
The European Union is simultaneously being forced to increase defense spending, support Ukraine and respond to renewed instability in global energy markets. The war in Ukraine has already triggered a structural shift in defense priorities, with European defense spending reaching hundreds of billions annually and new EU instruments targeting up to €800 billion in mobilized resources.
Since the past two months, tensions in the Middle East, especially in Hormuz, have reintroduced energy security risks that Europe hoped electrification would mitigate. About a fifth of global oil and LNG flows through Hormuz. Even partial disruptions lead directly to higher prices, increased volatility and renewed dependence on external suppliers.
This strategic contradiction is exacerbated by geopoliticalrisks, such as disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and increased defense spending, which threaten Europe’s energy security and complicate the transition to electrification despite its intended benefits.
Brussels is trying to invest heavily in electrification to reduce energy vulnerability, while at the same time being forced to invest heavily in defense and bear the costs of continued dependence on fossil fuels. The energy transition does not replace one system with another, but puts new costs on top of old ones.
This is the fiscal clash at the heart of the European project. The real question right now, which must be answered honestly, is: who is going to pay?
Most European governments are already financially constrained as public debt remains high after the pandemic and energy crises. They must also deal with increased defense spending as social pressures mount. The idea that only national budgets can finance the electrification of the economy is no longer credible.
Again, private capital is often presented as a solution. The Brussels strategy relies heavily on mobilizing institutional investors, reducing risks to projects and leveraging capital markets. Yet private capital is not a substitute for public strategy. With private capital flows, risk-adjusted returns are predictable. Grid infrastructure, industrial electrification and system flexibility often do not meet these criteria without significant public guarantees.
Moreover, the scale required is far beyond what current mechanisms can provide. Even ambitious instruments such as the Innovation Fund or the proposed Industrial Decarbonization Bank, with a target of tens or even hundreds of billions, remain small relative to the annual investment gap.
Europe’s uncomfortable truth is that it will have to adopt a fundamentally different funding model. Electrification on this scale clearly requires something closer to a strategic investment doctrine than a collection of policy instruments. Brussels will have to deal with a reality that requires priorities, coordination and, for all parties, critical acceptance of trade-offs.
First, Europe will need to raise energy infrastructure to the same strategic level as defense. If joint borrowing and coordinated funding can be justified for military capabilities, the same logic applies to cross-border power grids, storage systems and industrial electrification corridors. These are not optional climate investments; They are the foundation of economic resilience.
Second, existing revenue streams, particularly from carbon pricing mechanisms, need to be more aggressively redirected to infrastructure. The current allocation is insufficient relative to the scale of need.
Third, public financial institutions, the European Investment Bank and national development banks must significantly expand their role, especially in areas where private capital remains hesitant.
However, all of the above will obviate the need for prioritization.
Current reality shows that Europe cannot finance everything at once. It cannot electrify all industries at once, build all infrastructure at once and meet all geopolitical obligations without making choices. It is a political illusion to believe that coordination and efficiency gains will eliminate this trade-off.
The Dutch experience already shows what happens when these trade-offs are ignored. Infrastructure constraints begin to shape economic outcomes. Investments are delayed or diverted. The energy transition loses momentum. Not because of political opposition, but because of practical constraints.
If we scale up the Dutch experience to the European level, the consequences could be much more far-reaching. Industries dependent on reliable, high-capacity electricity, especially chemicals, steel and data infrastructure, will look beyond Europe when energy systems cannot deliver. Investment flows may shift to regions with more robust infrastructure. And Europe’s industrial base may decline just as it seeks to strengthen it.
This is the risk hidden in the current electrification story.
Brussels assumes that more renewable energy and more electrification will automatically lead to lower costs, more security and greater competitiveness. However, the facts on the ground show that without the infrastructure and financing to support it, the opposite can happen: higher costs, more volatility and reduced competitiveness.
The greatest danger is not a failure of electrification, but that it will be unbalanced. There is a huge risk of too much generation without infrastructure, too much demand without connectivity, and too much ambition without order.
This is already happening.
The Netherlands shows that even a highly advanced energy transition can reach physical limits. These limits are not theoretical. They are visible in grid congestion, limited renewable energy, delayed investment and limited economic growth.
Europe as a whole is now approaching the same tipping point.
Von der Leyen is right that electricity will define the future of Europe. But defining the future is not the same as building it. Brussels must understand that building requires infrastructure that takes decades, capital that runs into trillions, and political choices that are far more difficult than current rhetoric suggests. We are not just looking at an energy strategy when pursuing electrification, but a test of Europe’s ability to match ambition with reality.
Right now, that alignment is missing.
The physical limits of an electricity grid must be addressed by Europe, including the financial scale of its ambitions and the geopolitical pressures that shape its choices. If not, the electrification agenda remains unfinished. Again, the vision is not wrong, but the system needed to realize it has not yet been finalized. At the same time, the willingness to pay for it has not yet been fully recognized.
According to the plan, annual support for electrification will almost double to €10 billion by 2030, up from €5.5 billion today. The reason for this increase will be to redistribute existing spending and reduce the state’s own energy consumption, with funds earmarked for technologies such as electric vehicles and heat pumps to replace gas-based systems. Lecornu stressed that support will be targeted to those who need it most, while remaining in line with France’s deficit reduction targets.
Â
France’s electrification plan
Bloomberg writes that the government prioritizes structural changes over temporary solutions, a position Lecornu makes clear by stating, “This means rejecting measures that are too generous and too costly, that too often create windfalls and sometimes unnecessary costs without solving fundamental problems.” His comments reflect a deliberate shift away from broad subsidies to more targeted, long-term investments.
This marks a notable departure from 2022, when France spent tens of billions of euros to protect consumers from energy shocks. Those measures contributed to the largest budget deficit in the euro zone and, combined with political instability, made it harder to rebalance the fiscal. Rising borrowing costs have since added further pressure, with officials warning that higher bond yields linked to geopolitical tensions could increase debt repayment costs by billions.
Although the government had considered additional help for workers dependent on cars, those plans were set aside after a temporary drop in oil prices following a cease-fire with Iran. Lecornu indicated that flexibility remains, saying that further measures could be taken if fuel prices rise again and start significantly affecting vulnerable workers.
Â
Â
Price TTF gas supply year 2027 (eur/MWh) – day cloud candle, log scale
Coal
Global coal demand and prices rise sharply as Hormuz disruption triggers fuel swap
Thermal coal prices rose sharply in March and remain high through April as disruption in the Strait of Hormuz forces a global return to coal. Thermal coal futures in Newcastle firmed above $140/ton in March, marking the largest monthly increase since the peak of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in May 2022. Prices have since fallen to about $132/ton as of mid-April, still about 39% higher on an annual basis. According to Wood Mackenzie , FOB Newcastle averaged $126/tonne of 6,000 kcal/kg coal in March, up from $114/tonne in February, while CFR ARA prices reached $123/tonne and FOB Richards Bay averaged around $110/tonne.
“With supply shocks of this magnitude, coal becomes a crucial safety net for energy security,” said Sushmita Vazirani, principal analyst for Bulk Commodities at Wood Mackenzie. “Despite decarbonization commitments across Asia, tightening LNG supply and higher prices are accelerating fuel switching back to coal.”
Although the Strait of Hormuz is not a major direct transit route for coal, the indirect effects are significant. Reduced availability of LNG has raised gas prices worldwide, making coal a more competitive option for price-sensitive buyers. As Heatmap News reported, Anthony Knutson, the global head of thermal coal market research at Wood Mackenzie, who had announced peak sea markets just last year, now sees a longer plateau: “Everyone is running back to energy security.”
Across Asia, the shift is dramatic. The Japanese government announced it would temporarily lift restrictions on coal-fired power plants for a one-year emergency period. Before the crisis, Japanese policy limited coal use to 50% with plans to phase out coal use completely. South Korea suspended seasonal capacity restrictions, which typically limited coal plant use to 80%, allowing year-round operation. Taiwan is preparing to restart its 2.1 GW Hsinta coal-fired power plant, which can process about 5.5 million tons of coal annually. Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines are restarting decommissioned plants or operating existing ones at maximum capacity. In India, the government ordered imported coal plants to run at maximum capacity, including reactivating a previously decommissioned Tata Power plant.
Supply pressure amplifies demand growth. Indonesia, the world’s largest coal exporter, is prioritizing domestic consumption over exports, tightening supply for Asian importers. As Fortune reported, “Indonesia is prioritizing domestic coal consumption over exports, tightening supply for Asian imports,” said Rystad Energy analyst Vicky Janita. Rising crude oil prices are also putting direct pressure on producers: Wood Mackenzie notes that for every $10 per barrel increase in crude oil, mine site costs rise by $1 to $3 per ton because of higher diesel prices in mining operations and transportation.
In Europe, the impact is different. Italy has delayed its coal phase-out from 2025 to 2038, passing legislation in late March that classifies some coal plants as strategic standby assets. Italy’s energy minister indicated that the Brindisi and Civitavecchia plants could be recommissioned if gas prices consistently exceed €70/MWh. Germany also expressed its willingness to keep coal plants as reserve assets longer than planned. However, Europe’s remaining coal capacity is significantly smaller than it was during the 2022 crisis, and the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) found that in March, coal generation outside China actually fell 3.5%, as solar (+14%) and wind (+8%) generation offset the decline in gas-fired generation. Worldwide sea transport of coal also fell 3%, to its lowest level since 2021. CREA argues that no large-scale revival of coal is visible in the data, despite widespread expectations.
In the US, the coal market is moving in the opposite direction. EIA ‘s April 2026 forecast predicts coal consumption for power generation will decline 10% in the first half of 2026 from a year earlier, with an increase in utility supplies averaging 3 million short tons per month. Total U.S. coal production is projected at 517 million short tons for 2026.
The main risk is carbon lock-in. As Fortune noted, sunk costs (“sunk cost”) and the political economy of energy budgeting make it difficult to re-lock once a coal-fired plant is brought back into service. “There is a danger of a long-term carbon lock-in once countries decide to reverse their plans to phase out aging coal-fired fleets,” warned Sharon Seah of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. Whether the current coal spike will be a temporary crisis response or a structural reversal of the decline trajectory depends greatly on how long the Hormuz disruption lasts and how quickly LNG flows recover.
Â
Coal API2 CIF ARA delivery year 2027 (usd/t) – week cloud candle, log scale
Emission certificates
Continued decline in global media climate; Agitprop does not bode well for future Net Zero support
Despitedecades of careful education by disinterested journalists designed to build a nonexistent climate emergency, they have failed to halt a dramatic, ongoing collapse of mainstream media stories supporting the Net Zero fantasy. Last year there was a 14% drop in climate-related stories worldwide compared to 2024, which was already down 38% from the peak of Greta hysteria in 2021. Perhaps trusting consumers are no longer willing to read the doomsday stories, let alone pay for identical, narrative-driven nonsense that is often so one-sided as to be an insult to intelligence. Example 1: the BBC’s October 2023 classic – climate change could make beer taste worse.
Climate change
The largest declines in 2025 were found in Africa, the Middle East and North America. Interestingly, the failed Amazon COP30 meeting in November 2025 was followed the following month by collapsing news coverage in Latin America (-61%), Oceania (-52%) and the European Union (-41%). A period of private grief seems to have given the long-suffering public a merciful break from the incessant cacophony of climate catastrophizing.
News of continued declines in coverage of climate change and global warming is included in the latest annual report from the Media and Climate Change Observatory (MeCCO) at the University of Colorado Boulder. To produce the latest findings, MeCCO tracked the volume of newspaper, news agency, radio and TV climate stories in 59 countries and seven regions. The work is said to have used a consistent methodology since 2004. The chart below clearly shows the spikes in Greta hysteria around the beginning of the current decade, and the earlier Gore scam that followed the release of his film“An Inconvenient Truth.
2004-2025 World newspaper coverage of climate chnage of global warming
University journalism courses often offer climate modules, but the prospects for aspiring students who want to make the world safe for Net Zero fanatics do not look good. The Guardian can only do so much, but in the UK, coverage was down 34% in the 12 months to November 2025. In the US, layoffs have begun in full force. Last year, new managers at CBS News laid off most of the climate crisis team. Recent reports suggest that everyone on climate has now been sent away. In February 2026, the Washington Post cut 14 positions for climate journalists, leaving only five journalists.
Last year was a bad time for climate advocates funded largely by Green Blob billionaires seeking social upheaval by depriving modern (and developing) industrial nations of vital hydrocarbons. Prepared journalists working in narrative-driven mainstream media are seen as essential to building fear of the fabricated climate crisis. One of the first lessons that useful idiotic fear-mongers learn is that the opinion, often erroneously referred to as a theory, that humans are the cause of most if not all of the recent climate change is ‘settled’. Non-newsmen are not encouraged to wonder if this is the first scientific opinion declared as “settled,” or at least the first since the Roman popes of old ruled on these matters ex cathedra .
In the United Kingdom, the National Council for the Training of Journalists (NCTJ) is a respected industry-based charity that has been active since the 1950s. But its training on climate change is laughable. In what other research fields are journalists encouraged to rely on a supposed “consensus,” and encouraged not to share alternative viewpoints? What faster way is there, one might ask, to replace the writer with an AI tool? Funded by the Google News Initiative (GNI), the NCTJ is offering a free e-learning course on climate reporting. As with all climate science sessions preparing agitprop, there is a warning to avoid “false balance. In effect, this means denying publicity to skeptical scientists who examine opinion by following the timeless process of scientific falsification.
GNI is a major funder of efforts to silence dissenting climate opinions. One of the main weapons deployed involves so-called “fact-checkers” who, in the Daily Skeptic’s own experience, do little more than attack uncomfortable scientific findings with outspoken claims of “disinformation. Discussing the underlying science does not seem to be a priority; rather, the negative statements are helpful in canceling advertising and reducing impact in the social media sector.
In the United Kingdom, GNI is a funder of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Until recently, it ran a six-month care for climate writers under the Oxford Climate Journalism Network (OCJN). The course also received significant funding from former Extinction Rebellion paymaster Sir Christopher Hohn, and over four years it hosted about 800 journalists from 80 countries. Unfortunately, the indoctrination pundit battened down the hatches late last year. The“flagship online course” will no longer give assignments requiring participants to write a news story demonstrating why mangoes are less tasty this year because of climate change. We can only pray that similar restrictions will now apply to other, climate-related foods.
It seems the world is getting tired of clickbait, centrally determined climate drivel that for too long has provided an unscientific basis for Net Zero fantasy. Pseudoscientific gaslighting has enabled manipulated computer models to predict headline-grabbing ‘tipping points’ of Armageddon and has contributed to the mainstream dissemination of unquestioned lies that extreme weather events are getting worse. Good news stories like the great “greening” of the earth are ignored, while the crucial role that the “gas of life” carbon dioxide plays in this is downplayed. No one does that more than SciLine, a Green Blob-funded operation affiliated with the Association for the Advancement of Science, publisher of Science.
“Building Geothermal on a large scale”: Fervo Energy secures 1.7 GW turbine supply deal with Turboden
Fervo Energy and Turboden, part of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Group, announced a three-year framework to supply Organic Rankine Cycle (ORC) turbines for up to 35 of Fervo’s standardized 50 MW GeoBlocks. The deal totals 1.7 gigawatts of carbon-free, deployable baseload, marking an important step toward scaling up next-generation geothermal in the United States.
The agreement builds directly on an earlier pact that includes three GeoBlocks at Fervo’s Cape Station project in Utah, where Phase I commissioning is now at an advanced stage with start-up expected later this year. By capturing supply chain capacity and shortening delivery times for Turboden’s proprietary ORC technology, the framework strengthens the resilience of domestic generation and accelerates project timelines at a time when U.S. electricity demand from data centers and AI infrastructure is surging.
ORC units efficiently convert geothermal heat into electricity, providing 24/7 stable electricity that variable renewable energy can hardly match. Fervo CEO Tim Latimer called the partnership with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries an important step to “strengthen the supply chain needed to build geothermal on a large scale.”
This announcement comes at a time of increasing interest in geothermal and nuclear power. With explosive electricity demand from AI and data centers, the market is showing a growing aversion to variable, renewable energy that cannot guarantee reliable baseload power when it is needed most.
We hope no one has forgotten how (not) useful renewable energy was during Winter Storm Fern….
There is a difference between what wind and solar promise and what they can deliver.
During winter storm Fern, these energy sources did not provide the reliable power our communities needed. It’s time for Democrats to realize that our grid requires coal, natural gas and nuclear power…
Energy and Commerce Committee (@HouseCommerce) February 10, 2026
There’s a difference between what wind and solar promise, and what they can deliver.
During Winter Storm Fern, these energy sources failed to deliver the reliable power our communities needed. It’s time for Democrats to realize our grid requires coal, natural gas, and nuclear… pic.twitter.com/mZWFpohqW0
Fervo sees great potential in the geothermal revolution that is reshaping the U.S. energy mix, with improved techniques and big-tech support turning the earth’s heat into a practical solution to explosive electricity needs.
With more than 470 Turboden plants in operation worldwide, the partnership positions Fervo to deliver reliable megawatts where the power grid needs them most.
In an era of relentless demand growth, such a capacity of companies seems increasingly indispensable.
Â
Disclaimer
This analysis is copyrighted by COMCAM. Texts may not be reproduced, copied, made public or duplicated without the express permission of COMCAM. Quotations or partial takeovers are also not permitted.
English
Nederlands
Global
The Netherlands
United Kingdom
